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False Claims Act Liability for Higher Education Institutions: Analyzing Claim Against 
Charlotte School of Law and Infilaw Systems 
Brian C. Munsie* 
 
I. Introduction 
In mid-August, prior to the beginning of the 2017 fall semester, the Charlotte School of 
Law (CSOL) announced that it would be closing.1  The announcement came in the wake of public 
disclosure of shortcomings in the school’s ability to operate effectively.2  The American Bar 
Association (ABA) Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar published notice that it 
was placing CSOL on probationary status for failing to comply with several ABA standards, 
including standards for bar passage and admissions.3  The school subsequently lost its ability to 
receive federal funding for student tuition, and also lost its license to operate in the state, thereby 
forcing CSOL to close.4  The school is now facing a plethora of lawsuits filed by students and 
faculty.5   
One lawsuit the school is facing is a False Claims Act (FCA) suit filed by a former teacher, 
Professor Barbara Bernier, alleging that the school violated the FCA for allowing students to 
submit claims for federal funds under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) while failing 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Rutgers, The State University of New 
Jersey.  I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dean Charles Sullivan, for his helpful guidance and endless wisdom. 
1 Stephanie Francis Ward, Feds Started Criminal Investigation of Charlotte School of Law, According to Civil Filing, 
ABA J. (Aug. 29, 2017, 5:44 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/feds_started_criminal_investigation_of_ 
charlotte_school_of_law_according_to/.   
2 Ann Doss Helms, Charlotte School of Law Put on Probation by American Bar Association, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER 
(Nov. 17, 2016, 8:51 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/education/article115339503.html. 
3 Id. 
4 Ward, supra note 1. 
5 See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Student Lawsuits Against Charlotte School of Law Consolidated, ABA J. (Oct. 
17, 2017, 12:54 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/student_lawsuits_against_charlotte_school_of_law 
_consolidated.  
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to comply with certain requirements.6  Professor Bernier filed the qui tam7 action under seal in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in June 2016, a few months prior to 
her voluntarily leaving the school.8  The complaint was unsealed in August 2017 after the United 
States Attorney’s Office filed a notice that it would not intervene.9  The United States Attorney’s 
motion to unseal the lawsuit gave no indication whether the decision to not intervene was based 
on lack of evidence against the school, but it stated that the investigation “will continue.”10  It is 
unclear whether the government’s investigation into the school is ongoing, but Professor Bernier 
as the relator and whistleblower will presumably continue pursuing the action.11  Her complaint 
alleges that the school manipulated bar exam and employment statistics by offering students who 
were unlikely to pass the exam a monetary stipend to forego taking the exam.12  Additionally, 
Professor Bernier alleges that CSOL dramatically transformed the nature of the school in terms of 
faculty and resources after obtaining full accreditation,13 and downwardly adjusted minimum GPA 
requirements in order to retain failing students who otherwise should have been academically 
dismissed.14 
This Comment will discuss the current FCA lawsuit filed against CSOL and Infilaw, its 
parent corporation, and address whether non-compliance with accreditation standards following 
entry into a Program Participation Agreement (PPA) should be a basis for a valid claim under the 
                                                 
6 Elizabeth Olson, Federal Inquiry of Charlotte Law School Is Disclosed by Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/dealbook/charlotte-law-school-federal-inquiry.html.  
7 A qui tam action is a lawsuit brought by a private citizen (popularly called a “whistleblower”) against a person or 
company who is believed to have violated the law in performance of a contract with the government or in violation of 
a government regulation.  Qui tam action, LAW.COM, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1709 (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2018).  Qui tam suits are brought “for the government as well as for the plaintiff.”  Id. 
8 Olson, supra note 6. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Ward, supra note 1. 
13 Complaint at ¶ 53, United States ex rel. Bernier v. Infilaw Corp., 2016 WL 9526145 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2016) (No. 
16-970), http://www.abajournal.com/files/bernier_v._Infilaw_2016.pdf. 
14 Id. at ¶ 69. 
 3 
FCA.  Part II will discuss the history of CSOL and Infilaw, the background of the FCA, and the 
requirements of both Title IV of the HEA and PPAs that schools must enter into with the 
Department of Education in order to be able to receive federal funding.  Part III will address the 
current state of FCA liability for higher education institutions based on theories of non-compliance 
with statutes, regulations, and promises made under the PPA.  It will focus on the current circuit 
split as to the viability of the false-certification theory of liability under the FCA.  Recently, the 
Supreme Court imposed liability based on the false-certification theory in the medical context,15 
but the effect of that holding on educational institutions is unclear.  Part IV will analyze the facts 
of the lawsuit filed by Professor Bernier against CSOL and Infilaw, and will analyze whether the 
complaint states a valid claim of FCA liability.  This Comment posits that, while the complaint 
may not have pled with specificity the alleged “bad faith” that is normally required under a pre-
formation false certification theory of liability, Professor Bernier should be held to the more lenient 
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) pleading some courts have applied.  But even if 
the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to prove bad faith entry into the PPA, she should be 
allowed to continue based on the theory of post-formation false certification.  Part V briefly 
concludes. 
II. Background 
A. The Infilaw System and CSOL 
The Infilaw System is a consortium of private, independently-operated for-profit law 
schools in the United States.16  Infilaw is owned primarily by Sterling Partners, a Chicago-based 
private equity firm, and is headquartered in Naples, Florida.17  It was founded by Sterling Partners 
                                                 
15 See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989 (2016). 
16 THE INFILAW SYSTEM, www.infilaw.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
17 Id. 
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in 2004, shortly after Sterling’s purchase of the Florida Coastal School of Law.18  Infilaw then 
established two other for-profit law schools—Arizona Summit Law School, located in Phoenix 
Arizona, in 2004, and CSOL in 2006.19  The company’s approach has been to mostly target students 
who do not qualify for admission to top law schools,20  including many minorities,21 because of 
low grade-point averages and LSAT scores.22  The schools supposedly emphasize providing more 
feedback than other law schools, and focus on “hands on” learning.23  With the closing of CSOL, 
the consortium currently consists of two ABA-accredited law schools, Arizona Summit Law 
School in Phoenix, Arizona, and Florida Coastal School of Law in Jacksonville, Florida.24  
Arizona Summit Law School has recently experienced operating troubles of its own, 
however, being placed on probation by the ABA and ranking second-to-last out of all ABA 
approved schools in “ultimate” bar passage rates.25  Ultimate bar passage rates show the percentage 
of graduates who passed the bar within two years of graduation.26  Just sixty percent of the 2015 
                                                 
18 Zach Warren, For-profit Law Schools on the Rise, CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 21, 2013), https: 
//www.law.com/insidecounsel/2013/10/21/for-profit-law-schools-on-the-rise/. 
19 Ashby Jones, Private-Equity Group’s for-Profit Law School Plan Draws Critics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/privateequity-group8217s-forprofit-law-school-plan-draws-critics-1382312687?mg= 
prod/accounts-wsj. 
20 U.S. News & World Report ranks 197 fully accredited law schools based on a weighted average of several factors 
including quality assessment, selectivity, placement success, and faculty resources.  Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, 
Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP. (Mar. 13, 2017, 9:30 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology.  U.S. News assigns a 
numerical rank to the top three-fourths of law schools, while the bottom quarter are listed as Rank Not Published.  Id.  
CSOL was unranked due to its probationary status.  Id.  Arizona Summit Law School and Florida Coastal School of 
Law were both listed as Rank Not Published.  Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP., 
https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings/page+7 (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
21 For example, Professor Bernier alleges that CSOL recruited heavily from Livingstone College in Salisbury, North 
Carolina, a historically black college, admitting approximately forty Livingstone students in 2013 and fifty in 2014.  
See Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 60.  Both sets of students allegedly failed at extremely high rates with most not 
making it through a second semester.  Id.  
22 Jones, supra note 19. 
23 According to Peter Goplerud, the president of Infilaw’s consulting arm, one “informal goal” of the school’s is for 
students to obtain at least 400 hours of work experience prior to graduation.  Id. 
24 Our Schools, THE INFILAW SYSTEM, http://www.infilaw.com/our-schools-2/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
25 Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit Law School Has Nation’s Second-lowest Bar Passage Rate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 
23, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/03/23/arizona-summit-law-school-
second-lowest-bar-passage-rates-country/450085002/. 
26 Id. 
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Arizona Summit graduates had passed the bar, while the average of all other schools was eighty-
eight percent.27  Additionally, a FCA suit brought against the school by two former professors, 
making similar allegations to those in the Bernier complaint, was recently unsealed in March 
2018.28  While the suit was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in February, a lawyer 
representing the former professors said his clients stand by their allegations against the school 
despite their decision to not move forward with the suit.29  Florida Coastal School of Law has also 
faced recent troubles, ranking among the lowest in bar passage rates in the state and failing federal 
gainful-employment ratings—which signals graduates’ inability to manage student loan debt based 
on their post-graduation earnings.30  The ABA sent the school a letter notifying its administrators 
that the school was out of compliance with accreditation standards, but the school has not yet been 
placed on probation or sanctioned.31 
CSOL obtained provisional accreditation32 from the ABA in 2008 and full accreditation in 
2011.33  The ABA performed a full site inspection of the school in 2014.34  Since obtaining full 
accreditation in 2011, students of CSOL have been eligible to apply for and obtain federal 
financing for their legal education.35  Within three months of becoming fully accredited and site 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Karen Sloan, Second Law Prof Whistleblower Suit Against InfiLaw Unsealed, DAILY BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/04/04/second-law-prof-whistleblower-suit-against-infilaw-
unsealed/.  
29 Id. 
30 Andrew Kreighbaum, Accreditors’ Scrutiny of Florida Law School Renews Concerns Over Oversight, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/11/15/accreditors-scrutiny-florida-law-
school-renews-concerns-over-oversight.  
31 Id. 
32 The ABA grants provisional approval to applying schools who establish that they are “in substantial compliance 
with each of the Standards” and present “a reliable plan for bringing the school into full compliance within three years 
after receiving provisional approval.”  The Law School Accreditation Process, ABA SEC. LEGAL EDUC. ADMISSIONS 
B., https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/ 
council_reports_and_resolutions/2016_the_law_school_accreditation_process.authcheckdam.pdf. 
33 Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 51. 
34 Id.  The ABA conducts regular site visits of fully approved law schools every seventh year.  Law School Site Visits, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/law_school_site_visits.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
35 Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 52. 
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certified, the Bernier complaint alleges that the school began instituting buy-outs of faculty and 
staff in order to cut costs, which dramatically altered the nature of the school as compared to when 
it obtained accreditation.36  Following the 2014 site visit, the ABA made several findings of 
concern about the school’s operation in a report to the school.37  The report stated the school was 
out of compliance with several ABA standards for law schools, including “its ability to provide a 
rigorous program that prepares students for admission to the bar and its application of reasonably 
high standards for admission.”38  Further reports showed the school was troubled with exceedingly 
high drop-out rates and low bar-passage rates among first-time takers.39  But despite the school’s 
failure to come in to compliance, the ABA did not place the school on probation until November 
2016, two and a half years after issues of noncompliance were first discovered.40  Subsequently, 
the Department of Education removed the school’s Title IV eligibility, and CSOL students were 
no longer able to receive Title IV funds for their education.41  Ultimately the school’s license to 
operate in the state of North Carolina expired, and CSOL was forced to close in August 2017, just 
weeks prior to the start of the fall semester.42 
B. The FCA 
The FCA, often called the Lincoln Law, was signed in 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln 
in response to deception and fraud practiced on the government in its purchasing of horses, 
weapons, ammunition, and other goods needed for the Civil War.43  The FCA imposes liability on 
                                                 
36 Id. at ¶ 53. 
37 Clare McCann, A Play-By-Play of Charlotte School of Law’s Closure, NEW AMERICA (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/csl-part-one/. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.   
41 Id. 
42 Elizabeth Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlotte-school-of-law-closes.html.  
43 Harry Litman, ‘Lincoln’s law’: The Most Important Supreme Court Case Under the Radar, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Jun. 13, 2016), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2016/06/13/Lincoln-s-law-The-Supreme-
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any person or entity that knowingly makes, or causes another to make, any false or fraudulent 
claim for payment to the government.44  “Knowingly” is defined in the statute as “actual 
knowledge,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or “reckless disregard 
of the truth or falsity of the information,” and requires “no proof of specific intent to defraud.”45  
The statute has been amended several times since its enactment to make it more effective.46  
Violators of the FCA are subject to a fine between $5000–10,000 per violation, treble damages, 
and attorney’s fees and costs to successful whistleblowers who bring claims on behalf of the 
government.47 
The statute contains a qui tam provision which allows private individuals, known as 
“relators,” to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the government against a party who has defrauded the 
government by a false claim.48  The provision allows any person or entity with evidence of fraud 
against federal programs or contracts which induced the government to wrongly pay out a claim 
to sue the wrongdoer in the name of the United States.49  A qui tam action must be filed under seal 
in a district court with jurisdiction over the matter, and the complaint and its contents are kept 
confidential until the seal is lifted.50  Additionally, a copy of the complaint and a written disclosure 
containing all of the material evidence of fraud the relator possesses must be served on the United 
States Attorney General and the United States Attorney for the district where the action is filed.51  
                                                 
Court-will-decide-whether-to-leave-in-place-a-robust-defense-against-fraud-passed-during-the-CivilWar/stories 
/201606130010.  
44 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2016). 
45 Id. § 3729(b). 
46 See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
47 Id. § 3729(a)(1), (3). 
48 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).  
49 False Claims Act/Qui Tam FAQ, NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER, http://www.whistleblowers.org/resources 
/faq-page/false-claims-actqui-tam-faq#what%20is%20false (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
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The government may choose to intervene in the lawsuit and take over the action, but if the 
government does not intervene the relator is permitted to proceed with the suit.52   
The FCA has become the government’s “primary litigation tool” in combatting fraud 
against it.53  Both the judicial decisions and legislative history of the Act show a preference to 
extend liability broadly.  In 1968, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the FCA to “all 
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money.”54  Then in 1986 Congress 
amended the Act to broaden the ability for relators to bring a claim and increase the financial 
incentives available to successful relators.55  The amendment allowed relators to bring FCA actions 
even if the government was already aware of the fraud if the relator was the original source of the 
information.56  Congress further amended the Act in 2009 through the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act (FERA), which was enacted to enhance the government’s ability to combat financial 
fraud following the 2008 financial crisis, establishment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and 
increased economic stimulus spending.57 But FERA also added a materiality element to the FCA 
by requiring that a false record or statement be “material to a false or fraudulent claim.”58  The 
FCA defines “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, 
the payment or receipt of money or property.”59   
                                                 
52 Id.  
53 United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2010). 
54 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968).  The question before the Court was whether the FCA 
applied to a loan application submitted to a federal agency which contained false information.  Id. at 229.  The Court 
found that the congressional debates at the time the act was passed suggested the Act was “intended to reach all types 
of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government.”  Id. at 232. 
55 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (current version codified at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729 (2016)). 
56 Id. 
57 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 386, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 
3729 (2016). See also 155 CONG REC. E1090-03 (daily ed. May 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
58 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
59 Id. § 3729(b)(4). 
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Since 2009, the Department of Justice has recovered over $31 billion in settlements and 
judgements from FCA cases, recovering over $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2016 alone.60  Of the $4.7 
billion recovered in 2016, $2.9 billion related to actions originally brought by relators under qui 
tam provisions, and the government paid out $519 million to such private individuals.61  The 
majority of those actions involved claims against the healthcare industry, including drug 
companies, hospitals, nursing homes, and physicians.62  The Department also secured a significant 
amount of recoveries involving the financial industry from cases of housing and mortgage fraud 
in connection with federally insured residential mortgages.63  In recent years, however, there has 
been an increase in FCA litigation against for-profit schools that allegedly participated in 
fraudulent schemes to secure federal education funds.64  The increase in claims against for-profit 
schools follows the increased awareness of the predatory nature and educational shortcomings of 
these schools. 
There are two categories of false claims recognized by courts under the FCA: (1) factually 
false claims and (2) legally false claims.65  A factually false claim occurs when a claimant makes 
misrepresentations as to the goods or services it actually provides to the government.66  A legally 
false claim, also called false certification, occurs when a claimant falsely certifies compliance with 
a statute or regulation where compliance is a condition of government payment.67  Legally false 
                                                 
60 See Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in 
Fiscal Year 2016, JUSTICE.GOV (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-
billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 “For example, the second largest for-profit education company in the country, Education Management Corp., paid 
the United States $52.6 million to resolve allegations that it unlawfully recruited students, engaged in deceptive and 
misleading recruiting practices, and falsely certified compliance with Title IV of the Higher Education Act . . . .”  Id.  
65 United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (“[A] legally false claim is based on a ‘false certification’ theory of liability.”) (citing Rodriguez v. Our Lady of 
Lourdes Med. Ctr., 552 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
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claims can be based on either express or implied false certifications.68  Under the “express false 
certification theory,” a claimant is liable for falsely certifying compliance with a statute or 
regulation which is a prerequisite to receiving government payment.69  The “implied false 
certification theory,” however, finds a claimant liable for submitting claims for government 
payment without disclosing non-compliance with statutes or regulations that would affect 
eligibility to receive payment.70  Implied false certification is based on the common-law definition 
of fraud encompassing misrepresentations by omission.71 
C. The Higher Education Act and Program Participation Agreements 
Under Title IV of the HEA, the federal government operates several programs that provide 
educational funds to students to enable them to meet the financial burdens of higher education.72  
Programs providing assistance include the Federal Pell Grant, the Federal Family Education Loan 
Program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, the Federal Perkins Loan, and the 
Graduate Plus Loan.73  Students are eligible to obtain funds through federal programs only if they 
attend a qualifying school.74  To qualify, Title IV of the HEA requires schools to enter into PPAs 
with the Secretary of the Department of Education.75  In a PPA, the school agrees to comply with 
all statutory requirements of Title IV, any regulatory provisions promulgated thereunder, and any 
other arrangements, agreements, and limitations entered into under the authority of Title IV.76  The 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (noting that the “implied false certification theory of liability is premised ‘on the notion that the act of submitting 
a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal rules that are a precondition to payment’”) 
(quoting Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001). 
71 See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016). 
72 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099d (2016). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a). 
76 Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(1) (2017). 
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institution must also be accredited by the applicable accrediting agency.77  The Department of 
Education does not accredit schools directly, but the Secretary of Education approves accrediting 
agencies for different educational programs, who in turn set independent accreditation standards.78  
Once a school is qualified to receive federal funds, its students are eligible to apply to receive full 
financing for their education through federal programs.79 
III. Applying the FCA to Educational Institutions 
Due to the predatory recruitment tactics and fraudulent schemes that have plagued the for-
profit educational industry in recent years, there has been an increase in FCA suits brought against 
for-profit higher educational institutions.80  But because a claim under the FCA involves allegations 
of “fraud,” pleadings under the FCA must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Civil 
Procedure Rule 9(b).81  Courts have consistently applied Rule 9(b) to complaints filed under the 
scope of the FCA.82  Courts have differed, however, on the theories of FCA liability that can be 
extended to educational institutions. 
A. Heightened Pleading Requirements 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”83  This standard “does not 
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”84  The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”85  A claim cannot survive a 
                                                 
77 34 C.F.R. § 600.4(a)(5)(i) (2017). 
78 Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. American Bar Ass’n, 459 F.3d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2006). 
79 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
80 See DOJ, supra note 60.  
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
82 See United State ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002). 
83 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
84 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
85 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007)). 
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motion to dismiss where allegations are merely “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action.”86  The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to allege facts 
sufficient to allow a court to reasonably infer that the defendant’s alleged misconduct was 
unlawful.87   
Because they involve fraud, actions arising under the FCA are additionally subject to the 
heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).88   The heightened pleading 
standards under Rule 9(b) are a supplement, not a replacement, to the Rule 8(a) standards that 
apply to all pleadings.89  Rule 9(b) applies to actions where a plaintiff alleges fraud or mistake, and 
requires a plaintiff alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” 
but allows scienter to be alleged generally.90  The purposes of heightened pleading are: (1) to ensure 
“that the defendant has sufficient information to formulate a defense by putting it on notice of the 
conduct complained of;” (2) “to protect defendants from frivolous suits;” (3) “to eliminate fraud 
actions in which all facts are learned after discovery;” and (4) to protect “defendants from harm to 
their goodwill and reputation.”91  Rule 9(b) is generally satisfied if the complaint establishes: 
(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral representations 
or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement 
and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making) 
same, and (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled 
the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.92 
 
                                                 
86 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
87 Id. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
88 See United State ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002). 
89 Id. 
90 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
91 Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. 755 F. Supp. 1055, 1056–57 (S.D. 
Ga 1990)). 
92 Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 
2001)). 
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To serve the purposes of heightened pleading, the relator must provide “some indicia of reliability” 
to support the allegations that the defendant submitted a false claim.93 
In applying this standard to the FCA cases brought against educational institutions, there 
is little difficulty with providing particularity that a claim was submitted to the government 
because the claims submitted were requests from students for federal loans.  Instead, the facts that 
must be alleged with particularity are those showing the defendant’s false statements, which 
ultimately led the government to pay amounts it did not owe.94  For example, in Urquilla-Diaz v. 
Kaplan University, the Eleventh Circuit found the relator met the requirements of Rule 9(b) for an 
FCA claim based on a violation of the Department of Education’s regulation banning incentive 
compensation for admissions employees where the relator pled specific instances of salaries being 
adjusted based on numbers of enrollments.95  The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the 
claim that the school falsely certified that students were making satisfactory progress as a result of 
a grade inflation scheme because the relator failed to provide specific instances of students who 
would not have been making satisfactory progress but for the scheme.96   
B. False Certification Theory 
As noted previously, legally false claims under the FCA based on a theory of false 
certification can be either express or implied.97  The relevant certification of compliance must be 
both a “prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit” and the “sine qua non of receipt of 
government funding.”98  In United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized the viability of a FCA claim against the University of Phoenix, a for-profit entity, 
                                                 
93 Id. at 1311. 
94 Uquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University, 780 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2015). 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 1055. 
97 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
98 Urquilla-Diaz, 780 F.3d at 1053. 
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predicated on an express false certification theory.99  Relators, former enrollment counselors at the 
school, alleged that the University knowingly made false promises that it would comply with the 
incentive compensation ban required by the PPA.100  They further alleged that the University 
falsely certified compliance with the ban each year while knowingly violating the requirement; 
that, coupled with later claims for payment of Title IV funds, constituted false claims under the 
FCA.101   
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim, the Ninth 
Circuit accepted false certification as a viable theory of FCA liability and stated four essential 
elements: (1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that 
was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due.102  The court 
found that all of the essential elements were met and allowed the case to proceed.103  In articulating 
the necessity of alleging an actual false claim rather than a mere regulatory violation, the court 
stressed that it is the false certification of compliance that creates liability when certification is 
required prior to obtaining the government benefit.104   
The court found that the falsity element was met due to the University’s alleged violation 
of the incentive compensation ban because it had expressly agreed to comply with the ban (as well 
as all other statutory and regulatory requirements) in the PPA.105  As for the scienter element, the 
court found the element satisfied based on the allegations that University staff openly bragged 
about perpetrating a fraud and established procedures to deceive the government.106  The court 
                                                 
99 United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2006). 
100 Id. at 1169. 
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103 Id. at 1177. 
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found the materiality element was satisfied because eligibility to receive funds under Title IV is 
explicitly conditioned on compliance with all requirements contained in the PPA, including the 
incentive compensation ban.107  Notably, the court found that, in the context of Title IV and the 
HEA, any distinction between conditions of participation and conditions of payment was 
irrelevant, and all promises to comply with a PPA are conditions of payment.108  Finally, the court 
found that the relators properly alleged submission of claims to the government through a variety 
of requests for student funding.109 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hendow is significant because the court extended FCA 
liability to the University based on allegedly fraudulent conduct that was committed after entry 
into the PPA.  While the court stated both that “mere regulatory violations do not give rise to a 
viable FCA action,”110 and that “false claims must in fact be false when made,”111 the court based 
its finding on the University’s later failure to honor its agreement to comply with the ban when it 
entered into the PPA.112  The court stated that the claim was an express false certification because 
the signed, written PPA was an “express statement of compliance.”113  But the court did not look 
to whether the statement of compliance was false at the time the school entered into the PPA.114  
Thus, it appears that the claimant’s state of mind and intention at the time it enters into the PPA 
are irrelevant to the court’s analysis. 
                                                 
107 Id. at 1175–77. 
108 Id. at 1176 (stating “[t]hese conditions are also ‘prerequisites,’ and ‘the sine qua non’ of federal funding, for one 
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109 Id. at 1177. 
110 Id. at 1171 (quoting United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
111 Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1172. 
112 Id. at 1175.  The court noted that to receive federal funding under Title IV, the University was required to agree to 
comply with applicable regulations in the future, not merely have a history of compliance.  Id. at 1176. 
113 Id. at 1172, n.1 (noting that “[s]ome courts . . . have adopted a false certification theory whereby the certification 
need only be implied, rather than express. In those cases, if a party submits a claim for payment under a government 
program with requirements for participation, that claim is taken as an implied certification that the party was in 
compliance with those program requirements.”). 
114 See Id. 
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In Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University, the Eleventh Circuit expressly adopted the Ninth 
Circuit’s false certification theory.115  This case involved a consolidated qui tam action brought by 
three relators against a for-profit educational institution alleging the school falsely certified 
compliance with federal statutes and regulations in order to receive financial aid funds.116  The 
court noted that the mere disregard of regulations or improper internal practices cannot be a basis 
for FCA liability under section 3729(a)(1)(A) “unless, as a result of such acts, the [defendant] 
knowingly ask[ed] the Government to pay amounts it does not owe.”117  But the court stated that 
under section 3729(a)(1)(B), a defendant may be liable where a relator shows that (1) “the 
defendant made a false record or statement for the purpose of getting a false claim paid or approved 
by the government,” and (2) “the defendant’s false record or statement caused the government to 
actually pay a false claim, either to the defendant itself, or to a third party.”118 Therefore, to meet 
the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), a relator must allege, with particularity, that false 
statements or a fraudulent course of conduct actually led the government to pay out money it did 
not owe.119 
The Eleventh Circuit went on to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the relator’s claim 
based on the school’s violation of the incentive compensation ban, but the court affirmed the 
dismissal of claims based on other violations, including allegedly using a grade inflation scheme 
to falsely certify students as making satisfactory progress and violating the accreditation 
requirement under 34 C.F.R. § 600.5(a)(6).120  The relators alleged that the school was improperly 
paying incentive-based compensation to recruiters, while falsely certifying in a yearly letter to the 
                                                 
115 780 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2015). 
116 Id. at 1043. 
117 Id. at 1051–52. 
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Department of Education that it was in compliance with the ban.121  The court found that the relators 
met the heightened pleading standard for showing a violation of the incentive compensation ban 
by including specific facts about four former employees whose salaries were adjusted based on the 
number of enrollments secured.122   
The relators further alleged that the school engaged in a practice of inflating students’ 
grades in order to certify that they were making satisfactory progress, and used falsified documents 
to obtain accreditation.123  Under 34 C.F.R. § 668.34, “an institution must establish a reasonable 
satisfactory academic progress policy for determining whether an otherwise eligible student is 
making satisfactory academic progress in his or her educational program and may receive 
assistance under [T]itle IV, HEA programs.”124  The relator alleged Kaplan violated the 
Department of Education’s “satisfactory progress” regulation by engaging in a grade inflation 
scheme to falsely certify students as making satisfactory progress who otherwise would have been 
failing.125 The court noted that grade inflation could lead to a FCA violation where a school 
certified that a student was making satisfactory progress when he or she was not.126  The court 
found, however, that the relator had failed to plead specific instances of students who would not 
have been making satisfactory progress without the scheme, and affirmed the dismissal.127   
In evaluating the claim based on accreditation, the court stated that false statements made 
to an accreditation agency could lead to FCA liability because whether a school is accredited is 
material to the government’s decision to pay Title IV funds.128  The relator alleged that Kaplan 
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submitted backdated studies and budgets “as well as other ‘forged’ or ‘false’ documents” to its 
accrediting agency.129  The court affirmed the dismissal, however, because it found that the relator 
had failed to plead particular facts sufficient to infer a plausible connection between the school’s 
allegedly false statements and the accreditation agency’s decision to accredit the school.130  The 
court was willing to adopt a theory of FCA liability based on falsely obtaining accreditation, but 
required more in terms of pleading than what the relator had provided.  Specifically, the court 
required the relator to include specific facts or statements made in the pleadings that were essential 
to the school receiving or maintaining accreditation.131   
In United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd.,132 the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach to FCA liability in the context of Title IV funds.133  Sanford-Brown involved a 
claim brought by a relator, the former Director of Education at the for-profit college, alleging that 
staff, professors, administration, and ownership of the school had engaged in fraudulent conduct 
regarding admission and retention of students in order to maintain Title IV funding.134  The relator 
alleged violations of several federal regulations, including provisions that banned paying incentive 
compensation, required maintenance of accreditation, prohibited harassing students to attend class, 
and requiring students receiving Title IV funds to maintain a minimum GPA.135  The district court 
found “no clear manifestation of congressional or regulatory intent to condition payment of Title 
IV federal subsidies on compliance with the disputed Title IV [r]estrictions,” and granted summary 
judgement in favor of the defendant.136   
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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132 788 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2015), reinstated in part, superseded in part, 840 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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The Seventh Circuit analyzed the relator’s claim based on two different theories of liability.  
First, the court addressed the false record theory under section 3729(a)(1)(B) of the FCA, which 
imposes liability when any party “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”137  The court stated that to establish 
liability under this section, a relator must prove: (1) defendant made a statement or record in order 
to receive money from the government; (2) the statement or record was false; and (3) the defendant 
knew it was false.138  The court held that to establish that a defendant knowingly used a false record, 
the relator was required to establish the defendant’s mindset at the time of entry into the PPA.139  
The court further explained that promises of future performance do not become false due to 
subsequent non-compliance, and to prove liability based on the false record theory a relator must 
prove bad faith entry into the PPA.140   
The court then looked at the relators claim based on a false presentment theory under 
section 3729(a)(1)(A), which imposes liability on a party who “knowingly presents, or causes to 
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”141  The court articulated the 
requirements under section 3729(a)(1)(A) as: (1) a false or fraudulent claim; (2) which defendant 
presented, or caused to be presented, for payment; (3) with knowledge the claim was false.142  The 
court rejected the relator’s argument, along with the government as amicus curiae, that certification 
of compliance with Title IV restrictions upon entry into the PPA caused the presentment of false 
or fraudulent claims for payment when the school subsequently violated conditions of the PPA.143  
The court stated that according to the relator’s theory, a PPA “serves as a trigger poised to impose 
                                                 
137 Id.; 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2016). 
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FCA liability at some indefinite point in the future, because continued lawful receipt of the federal 
subsidies depends on continued compliance with the PPA.”144  The court held that FCA liability 
does not result from non-compliance with Title IV restrictions following entry into a PPA unless 
the relator proves fraudulent entry into the PPA.145  Because the relator failed to prove bad faith 
entry into the initial PPA, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgement in favor of the defendant.146 
The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari and vacated the Seventh 
Circuit’s judgement in Sanford-Brown.147  The Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for 
further consideration in light of the Court’s decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United 
States ex rel. Escobar.148  In Universal Health, the Court held that the implied false certification 
theory can be a basis for FCA liability “when a defendant submitting a claim makes specific 
representations about the goods or services provided, but fails to disclose noncompliance with 
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements that make those representations 
misleading with respect to those goods or services.”149   
On remand, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Court’s Universal Health holding to require 
two conditions to be met for implied false certification: first, “the claim does not merely request 
payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided,”150 and 
second, “the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.”151  The court noted 
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that the only part of its prior decision that was affected by Universal Health was that which 
addressed the false presentment claim under section 3729(a)(1)(A), which was based on a theory 
of implied false certification.152  In reinstating its original decision granting summary judgement, 
the Seventh Circuit found that neither condition was met in this case.153  The court stated that the 
relator offered no evidence showing that the defendant Sanford-Brown College made any 
representations in connection with its claim for payment.154  Further, the court found that the relator 
failed to establish the independent element of materiality because he offered no evidence that the 
government’s decision to pay money to the college would have been different if the college’s 
noncompliance with Title IV restrictions was disclosed.155   
It appears that the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Universal Health holding’s effect 
on Sanford-Brown is flawed for two reasons.  First, in allowing students’ financial aid claims to 
be submitted to the government, a college inherently represents that it is in compliance with the 
initial requirements that made it eligible to receive government funding in the first place.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Universal Health, “[a]nyone informed that a social worker at a . . . mental 
health clinic provided a teenage patient with individual counseling services would probably—but 
wrongly—conclude that the clinic had complied with core . . . Medicaid requirements.”156  
Similarly, anyone informed that a college was providing higher educational programs to students 
who receive funding through federal programs would likely conclude that the school had complied 
with HEA requirements.  The Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the claims submitted for 
payment in Universal Health contained payment codes and provider identification numbers which 
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corresponded to specific counseling services.157  The court stated that the college had not made any 
representations in connection with its claim for payment.158  The court’s narrow interpretation of 
what constitutes a “specific representation” is not warranted.  The standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court does not require representations made in addition to a claim for payment, but only 
that specific representations are made through a claim requesting payment.159   Simply by allowing 
students to submit claims for payment to the government, a college is representing that it is in 
compliance with the requirements of Title IV and the PPA.  The claim for payment is itself a 
representation of compliance.  Failing to disclose its noncompliance makes the representations 
“misleading half-truths.”160   
The second error in the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation was in finding that the independent 
materiality element had not been met.  The court correctly stated that the materiality requirement 
is “rigorous” and “demanding,” and requires more than showing that “the Government would have 
the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance.”161  But the court erred 
in finding that the government’s decision to pay would not “likely or actually have been different” 
if the government knew that the college was not in compliance with Title IV requirements.162  
Compliance with all statutory, regulatory, and contractual obligations contained in a PPA is a 
prerequisite to obtaining federal funds under Title IV.163  Thus, had it been disclosed that the 
college was violating certain requirements, the school would have likely lost its eligibility to 
receive federal funding and the government would have denied payment.   
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Despite these criticisms, the Seventh Circuit’s approach remains in tension with the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuit’s interpretations.  Thus, it is unclear what theories are viable, and what 
standards must be met, for bringing a valid cause of action against an educational institution under 
the FCA.  What is clear, however, is that the judicial decisions and legislative history show a 
preference for extending FCA liability broadly.  The predatory nature of some for-profit schools 
and the current student loan crisis make higher educational institutions prime suspects for 
committing fraudulent acts to secure federal funding.  The current FCA lawsuit brought against 
CSOL presents an interesting case involving false claims based on failure to maintain accreditation 
standards.  The case provides a good basis for extending FCA liability to educational institutions. 
IV. Applying FCA Liability to CSOL 
Professor Bernier’s FCA lawsuit alleges that CSOL and Infilaw entered into the initial PPA 
in bad faith and intended to defraud the federal government to falsely obtain Title IV funds.164  She 
alleges that CSOL and Infilaw “knowingly violated Title IV of the HEA, its implementing 
regulations . . ., and the PPA by making . . . fraudulent claims.”165  She alleges that CSOL and 
Infilaw are liable under the FCA under sections 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), and (C).166  Specifically, the 
complaint alleges that CSOL and Infilaw violated ABA Rules by, among other things, admitting 
academically underqualified students, failed to maintain accreditation standards set by the ABA 
(in violation of Title IV), recertified students as having made satisfactory progress when they had 
not, and, in advertising job placement rates, engaged in misleading practices by failing to disclose 
that graduates were “employed” by the law school to study for the bar exam.167  
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Under the express false certification theory as applied by the Ninth Circuit and expressly 
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, it appears that the complaint states a valid cause of action under 
the FCA because the relator has adequately alleged facts showing a fraudulent course of conduct 
causing the government to pay out money it did not owe.168  But even if it is found that the 
complaint does not meet the heightened pleading standard because it only generally alleges bad 
faith entry into the PPA without sufficient particularity under that theory, the court should extend 
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the implied false certification theory in Universal Health to 
allow the case to proceed. 
A. Express False Certification 
The Eleventh Circuit expressly adopted the false certification theory of FCA liability for 
educational institutions in Urquilla-Diaz.169  To meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 
9(b), a relator must allege specific facts about the time, place, and substance of the fraud, 
particularly, “the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who 
engaged in them.”170  While the Seventh Circuit requires a showing of fraudulent entry into a PPA 
for express false certification,171 the Eleventh Circuit has applied false certification to claims based 
on fraudulent conduct committed after entering the PPA.172   
In the complaint filed against CSOL and Infilaw, Professor Bernier alleges that the 
defendants entered into the initial PPA in bad faith with the intent to defraud the government.173  
But the complaint fails to include any factual allegations concerning the circumstances around the 
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party’s entry into the PPA.174  Professor Bernier did not begin teaching at CSOL until 2013,175 and 
thus was not present at the school when the PPA was signed.  She failed to provide any information 
that would provide an indicia of reliability concerning the formation of the PPA.176  Therefore, it 
seems that the complaint would fail to meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b) particularity.  In 
the Eleventh Circuit’s view,177 however, it seems the court will either “imply” fraudulent entry into 
the PPA based on fraudulent conduct committed after formation, or not require it at all.  While the 
Eleventh Circuit’s view directly conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s bad faith entry requirement,178 
the Eleventh Circuit’s view is more consistent with the FCA’s purposes in combatting fraud 
against the government.  In the Seventh Circuit’s view, a school could conceivably initially enter 
a PPA in good faith, then later decide to perpetuate a fraudulent scheme to obtain federal funds, 
and escape liability under the FCA.  This idea conflicts with the legislative and judicial preference 
to extend liability broadly.  In entering the PPA, a school expressly certifies it will comply with 
all requirements, and subsequent knowledge or purposeful noncompliance is sufficient to find a 
defendant liable under the express false certification theory.179   
The complaint does allege specific factual allegations pertaining to fraudulent conduct 
committed after entering the PPA, specifically relating to student admissions and certifications of 
satisfactory progress.180  ABA Rule 501(b) mandates that a school must not admit applicants who 
do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing the program of study and being admitted to the 
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bar.181  Additionally, ABA Rule 205(b) requires academically underqualified students to be 
admitted only if approved by the dean and faculty of the law school.182  Under ABA rules, the 
number of underqualified students admitted through conditional admission or an alternate 
admission program must not exceed ten percent of the class.183  The Bernier complaint alleges 
generally that academically underqualified students were admitted and states the school’s low 
LSAT scores compared to other schools.184  The complaint further alleges specific facts suggesting 
that the school knew the students were unqualified and would have a low probability of success in 
law school.  For instance, the relator alleges that during a faculty meeting in the spring of 2015, 
the CSOL Director of Bar Preparation stated that students being admitted to the school would have 
only a twenty-five percent chance of passing the bar exam.185 
Additionally, the relator alleges that the school made re-certifications of academically 
underqualified students as having made satisfactory progress as a condition for the continued 
receipt of federal financial aid.186  In order to remain eligible under Title IV and continue receiving 
educational funding, a student must be making “satisfactory progress.”187  The complaint states 
that CSOL President Chidi Ogene summarily adjusted the minimum passing GPA requirement 
down to 1.50 in order to retain students who otherwise should have failed.188  The complaint 
contains specific facts that the GPA adjustment allowed the school to retain sixty-five students 
who should have been dismissed.189  Further, the relator alleges that during a February 2016 faculty 
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meeting, Dean Conison stated that President Ogene took these actions because “the company 
[Infilaw] could not tolerate the financial loss or harm to its reputation.”190   
These specific factual allegations of fraudulent conduct showing the school knowingly 
violated requirements in order to receive Title IV funds sufficiently meet the heightened pleading 
requirements to state a claim under the FCA as applied by the Eleventh Circuit.  The standard for 
showing an FCA violation based on false certification requires: (1) a false statement or fraudulent 
course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay 
out money or forfeit moneys due.191  The factual allegations contained in the complaint establish a 
fraudulent course of conduct to meet the first requirement.  Additionally, the complaint contains 
sufficient particularity in providing specific dates, numbers of students, and conversations with 
administrators for which Bernier was present to establish the indicia of reliability that Rule 9(b) 
requires.192  Scienter may be alleged generally,193 and Bernier alleges that CSOL engaged in the 
fraudulent conduct in order to obtain federal funds.194  Further, the fraudulent conduct is material 
because if CSOL disclosed its noncompliance with Title IV requirements, it likely would have lost 
its eligibility to receive federal funds.  Finally, the conduct caused the government to pay out 
money it otherwise would not have in the form of student financial aid.  Therefore, the allegations 
in Professor Bernier’s complaint sufficiently state a claim of FCA violations against CSOL. 
B. Implied False Certification 
Even if the complaint fails to plead a viable claim under an express false certification 
theory, the court should extend liability under the implied false certification theory as articulated 
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by the Supreme Court in Universal Health.195  Under that standard two conditions must be met: (1) 
the claim makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, and (2) failure to 
disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements make 
those representations misleading half-truths.196  Both conditions are met under the facts of this case.  
By continuing to participate in Title IV programs and in reaffirming its duties, obligations, and 
promises under the PPA annually, the school made specific representations that it was complying 
with all requirements.  Additionally, by failing to disclose noncompliance the school made material 
misrepresentations for the purpose of receiving funds the government would not otherwise be 
required to pay.  The failure to disclose is material because compliance with all requirements of 
the PPA is a prerequisite to obtaining funding.  While the Supreme Court’s holding was limited to 
the healthcare context, the court should extend implied false certification liability to educational 
institutions in this context.  CSOL should be found liable for submitting claims for payment after 
knowingly breaking its promises and obligations under the PPA.  
V. Conclusion 
Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, FCA liability should be extended to 
CSOL for failing to maintain proper procedures, knowingly or intentionally, and causing millions 
of dollars to be paid out in student loans.  The predatory nature of some for-profit educational 
institutions is drastically adding to the current student loan crisis faced by students in the United 
States.  Policy concerns demand holding the responsible parties liable.  The extended period that 
CSOL was able to continue operating and benefitting from student loan payments it otherwise 
should not have received shows that accreditation agencies are not well equipped to combat against 
this sort of activity.  The FCA should be utilized against educational institutions that knowingly 
                                                 
195 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
196 Id. 
 29 
fail to maintain accreditation and other standards in order to deter the predatory practices of for-
profit universities.  
